Dec 2023--From IshaanTharoor, Wapo and Morgan Michaels , IISS.

But the biggest conflagration could take place in Myanmar, where the ruling junta is reeling from an offensive launched by a coalition of rebel armed groups and seeing mounting desertion in its ranks.

The current trajectory, however, “does not point towards a near-term regime collapse on the battlefield, absent unforeseen developments,” noted Morgan Michaels, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Myanmar is instead headed towards a new phase of the conflict, marked by a weakened but still dangerous regime, more intense violence and greater uncertainty.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/22/global-crises-humanitarian-war-2034-year-sudan-palestine-myanmar-burkina-faso/

Despite gains, major obstacles remain for Myanmar’s opposition forces

The battlefield successes enjoyed by the MNDAA and the TNLA are largely attributable to two key elements. Firstly, both groups prepared well for the offensive, spending nearly three years recruiting, arming and planning under the cover of an informal ceasefire with the regime. While such strategic patience is borne out of experience, it was also possible because the MNDAA and the TNLA conscript their armies and sustain their activities through the lucrative conflict economies of Myanmar’s borderlands. In contrast, newer resistance outfits rely primarily on donations and volunteer fighters and have promised total victory within a short time frame. Groups like the NUG cannot easily exercise the same degree of patience as the MNDAA and TNLA because maintaining popular support and participation in the revolution requires constant demonstrations of progress.

Secondly, the MNDAA and the TNLA enjoy support from China in the form of access to weapons, ammunition, commercial uninhabited aerial vehicles and liaison offices in the country. None of the other groups in Myanmar that are actively fighting the regime can match the firepower possessed by the MNDAA or the TNLA, almost all of which is traceable to China.

Despite being a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, the AA faces serious supply issues because it fights on the other side of the country under a military blockade. Recent opposition gains in places like Rakhine and Kayah states have instead been won through the sacrifice of hundreds of fighters sent to wage frontal assaults in concentrated formations that are highly vulnerable to air and artillery attack. Even with their comparatively superior firepower, the MNDAA and the TNLA have also employed human-wave tactics, and it is likely that the alliance suffered more than 1,000 casualties during Operation 1027. These are difficult losses for any non-state armed group to sustain.

Moreover, the Brotherhood Alliance’s reliance on China makes it particularly susceptible to the influence of Beijing, which has begun to push for a de-escalation via a negotiated truce. Though fighting has continued, a deal could potentially include a regime handover of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and other key areas of northern Shan State to the alliance. While they claim to be fighting to overthrow the regime, both history and the current pattern of fighting suggest that the Brotherhood Alliance groups are primarily focused on winning control of their own areas, a scenario that now appears likely. Even if the alliance intends to go further, it could require years of preparation to launch a fresh offensive on a scale comparable to Operation 1027. China has begun to restrict cross-border access as a way to pressure the Brotherhood Alliance into negotiating, and it will likely act to prevent a total regime collapse. No matter the trajectory in northern Shan State, events there alone cannot decide the outcome of the wider war. In the immediate aftermath of the Brotherhood Alliance’s gains, opposition forces elsewhere appeared to assume that the regime had lost its will to fight and would soon collapse. But this assumption has so far proven false. Outside of northern Shan State, the regime has demonstrated a willingness to keep fighting at any cost. While opposition forces now enjoy the initiative and may continue to win incremental gains, the current trajectory does not point towards a near-term regime collapse on the battlefield, absent unforeseen developments. Myanmar is instead headed towards a new phase of the conflict, marked by a weakened but still dangerous regime, more intense violence and greater uncertainty.

https://myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2023-12 end post