Tit for tat assassinations--Ukraine vs Russia--according to the figures here--successful attacks by Ukraine--see map- are deep in Russian territory and the majority are successful.

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The number of assassination attempts in Russia in the first three quarters of 2025 has already exceeded the annual figures for the previous three years. Russian forces went into overdrive in their quest to conquer Ukraine by doubling down on their offensive in the Donetsk region and relentlessly bombarding the entire country and especially its capital, Kyiv. This likely incentivised the hunt for senior Russian military figures. In April 2025, car bombs killed a senior defense engineer in charge of drone jamming devices and another lieutenant general, Yaroslav Moskalik, who was deputy chief of operations in Russia’s General Staff and was involved in the Normandy talks that secured ceasefires in Donbas in 2014 and 2015.

Most assassination attempts have been carried out with explosives, including mail bombs. These often involve unwitting accomplices recruited online within the country — a tactic that does not require infiltration and subsequent extraction of Ukrainian operatives and that Russia itself uses in its covert sabotage campaign in Europe. In 2025, ACLED also records at least two apparent suicide bombings: one that killed Armen Sarkisian, the founder of the Arbat battalion of ethnic Armenians operating in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, and another killing Zaur Gurtsiev, a former officer who led Russia’s aerial bombardment of Mariupol in 2022. In the latter case, the man who lured Gurtsiev on a date may have been unaware he was carrying a remote-triggered explosive.12 The string of assassinations may have prompted replication by local Russian groups such as ChVK Vengeance, whose members gunned down at least two lower-ranking military officials they believed to be responsible for war crimes in Ukraine. It is unclear whether these domestic groups are coordinating their activities with the Ukrainian special services, nor is the extent of such collaboration.

The evolution of the assassination campaign within Russia — from propaganda mouthpieces to those prosecuting and masterminding the invasion — points to Ukraine’s willingness to go to great lengths to disrupt Russia’s war machine. Not only striking military and oil sites, Ukraine is also hunting down individuals directly involved in the ongoing attempt to conquer Ukraine. As in the case of attacking physical objects within Russia, the targeting of individuals directly or indirectly involved in the war may not significantly disrupt Moscow’s ability to wage it, but the possibility of an extrajudicial execution far from the frontlines puts extra pressure on potential targets.