DraFt
3-17-09
1. Burma
faces three major ongoing crises: A
Political and/or a Constitutional Crisis, a Socio-Economic Crisis, and a
Humanitarian Crisis.
Political developments
inside Burma, including the handing down of harsh prison sentences to monks,
democracy activists, and politicians as well as the continuing rejection of
international demands for political reform, indicate that the Burmese generals
will not be retreating from their scheme to legitimize military rule in Burma
unless they face concerted action from the democracy forces at home and abroad
as well as from the international community.
The Burmese
generals' headstrong push to hold elections under a constitution unilaterally
written without the participation of major democratic and ethnic political
parties will entrench dictatorial rule by the incumbent corrupt military regime
for generations. This process needs to
be stopped.
The NLD and the
pro-democracy forces would like to see the return of Democracy to Burma as soon
as possible.
The leadership
of the democracy movement inside the country believes that the NCGUB and the
democracy movement outside the country should take a lead in creating more
political space inside and strive to bring change to the country with the
support of the international community.
Given this new responsibility, organizations
in the democracy and ethnic movements in exile will work even more closely
under common work programs and pursue common objectives. Their tasks in the next months especially before 2010 will be enormous,
making preparations to improve the capacity of the movement in exile as well as
inside the country, providing training programs to leaders and grassroots
personnel, unifying visions of different components of the movement, projecting
common objectives, and framing a working plan.
3. A Strategic Action Plan being prepared with the help of
exile politicians, legal scholars, economists, a human geographer and a
civil-military relations and other Burma experts and will include:
A. A
Constitutional Framework
B. Electoral
Law and System
C. A
Transitional Economic Plan
D. A
Security Review
E. National
Reconciliation
F. Return
of Refugees and Displaced Persons in a New Administration, when
Conditions
are Normalized.
4. In Burma, the polity and the economy are
closely linked to form a political economy that is highly dysfunctional
Between
the first coup by the Revolutionary Council in 1962 and the beginning of the
clampdown on the mass pro-democracy movement on September 18, 1988, when SLORC
was formed, Burma had a socialist economic system with a one-party military
government. The Burma Socialist Program
Party laid down much of the economic system that was in place in 1988 when
SLORC initiated an "open economy."
Since 1988, a
bizarre and even more distorted economy has appeared, with the state playing a
major role and its expenditures financed by the highly destructive expedient of
printing more money. The inflation rate
is currently 50% per annum, the highest in S.E.Asia.
A. The Constitutional Framework -- Underlying
Principles
& Basic Conditions
5. Introduction
The issue of
constitutional settlement lies at the heart of Burma’s national reconciliation.
Burma has
amassed significant “constitution capital”, despite being without one
for nearly 34 years since Independence and over sixty years of civil wars and
conflict. Despite this, constitutional
advance eludes us. This cannot be
secured without addressing the fault lines through talks, and constitutional
conversations or constitutional review.
The two fault
lines our areas of contention where dialog is likely to fall apart is:
(i)
Federalism, endorsed by the NLD, the Ethnic Nationalities
and large numbers of pro-democracy
parties and
(ii)
The role of the military in national politics.
In general, the
pro-democracy groups including the Ethnic Nationalities want a decentralized
federal union, civilian government and a parliamentary system with a president, in some cases with particular
reference to Ethnic and States Rights.
Key Stakeholders
NLD, UNLD, SNLD,
EN Ceasefire Groups, KIO, UNA, NCGUB, NCUB, DAB, ENC, KNPP, SSA etc.
SPDC, UWSA etc.
The SPDC wants a
unitary, centralized administrative state, a (military) president and a leading
role for the military in parliament, the government at all levels and in the
presidency and a parliament comprised of two houses at central level, but to
sit jointly for a number of key state law making powers, similar to the
People's Assembly of the Peoples Republic of China.
The SPDC drafted
a national constitution that reflects the type of state they desire. They plan to implement this constitution
after the 2010 "elections" which they also plan to hold.
Our task is to
provide a scenario whereby constitutional advance might be made, given the
tight constitutional constraints circumscribed by the SPDC's draft state
constitution, its seven step road map to a disciplined democracy, its tight
hold on the levers of state and economic power, the incarceration of key
political leaders, and the draconian laws that curtail basic freedoms, and a
modus operandi of command and control and political paranoia on a grand scale.
6. The
SPDC Constitution – unresolved issues.
·
The SPDC’s constitutional framework, contained
in its seven-step roadmap, adds to neither the capital nor the advance.
·
The SPDC’s constitutional framework does not
seek to resolve competing ideas on nationhood, identity, language, political
and economic systems and which moral values should be promoted or
disavowed.
·
The SPDC’s constitutional framework does not
seek to resolve the constitutional fault line running through the political
heart of Burma, marked by secession, federalism, and the Tatmadaw’s
constitutional role in national political life.
·
Secession is now dead - a major constitutional
advance on the part of all the Ethnic Nationalities, but federalism-desired by
democratic groups and Ethnic Nationalities, seen as the best approach to a multi-ethnic-diverse
nation, and detested by the Tatmadaw leaders seen as the disintegration of the
nation, remains unresolved.
·
The SPDC say that the National Conventions’s
constitutional principles, that mandated Rangoon as the capital, cannot be
changed, but did so without comment, when they changed the country’s capital
from Rangoon to Naypyidaw.
·
The draft constitution says that it will apply as soon as approved
through a referendum and the SPDC agreed with NC delegates to postpone its
implementation until after the 2010 election.
·
The SPDC’s constitutional framework,
incorporating the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law (14/89), Declaration 1/1990, NC
Orders, Working procedures, & Rules, Order 5/96, Seven-Step Roadmap to
Disciplined Democracy, the 54 Member Technical Drafting Committee, 2008
referendum, and the planned 2010 elections fails the legitimacy tests of rightful architects, rightful process and
rightful design. This leaves the
SPDC’s planned 2010 elections in “legitimacy
limbo”. Credibility however, can
come through constitutional review.
7. Calls for
Constitutional Review
·
The clarion call by all parties, except the
SPDC, is and remains constitutional review.
·
For a transition to take place that has some
chance of sticking, constitutional review is essential. It can be best approached by recalling the
constitutional capital that has been amassed, scope out where the country wants
to be now and in 10 to 50 years. For example, it would be good to be peaceful
and prosperous and as General Than Shwe says, when referring to the
constitutional referendum and the 2010 elections, for Myanmar to hold its head
high in global society.
·
In seeking constitutional review it is essential
to promote just that to enable a transition.
It can include a constitutional implementing team, necessary to implement the country’s constitution, to include
sunset and sunrise clauses and the mechanisms of machinery of state, that will
be needed in a new state structure.
·
This requires an electoral law system to be
established that will include amendments to the political parties’ laws, or new
ones. (See also the section on Electoral
Laws.
·
All major groups directly involved continue to
call for any transition process to be inclusive,
i.e. to have talks and for constitutional review. (See attached comments)
·
All major groups denounce secession. (See their
respective draft constitutions)
·
All major groups, except the Tatmadaw, desire a
constitutional framework that incorporates a form of Federalism.
·
It is important to understand and recognize the
“legal” genesis of the SPDC’s National Convention (NC) found in Declaration
1/1990. It is critical for three
reasons:
(i) All
parties agreed to work with it, albeit reluctantly, including the NLD.
(ii) It
repeats the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law (14/89) at Chapter 2, Section 3
stating: “The Pyithu Hluttaw shall be formed with the Hluttaw representatives
who have been elected according to this law from the constituencies.”
(iii) Declaration
1/1990 further states at Section 20 that those elected in the 1990 elections
have the mandate to prepare the country’s constitution, “Consequently under the present circumstances, the representatives
elected by the people are those who have the responsibility to draw up the
constitution of the future Democratic State.” (NC started with
approximately 15 per cent of MPs, and finished with approximately 1 per cent of
MPs) It further sets some limiting conditions, but
these representative fundamentals remain unaltered
(iv) NLD have said they want to convene the Parliament
to have constitutional review. Refer to
Declaration 1/1990 and at least have regard to it, to launch talks re.
constitutional review
8. What the draft SPDC
constitution does and does not do.
It
does contain a few good points, the common law writs and such, but these are
overwhelmed by its comprehensive fatal flaws.
It does --
·
These
provide amnesty for any crimes committed for the current
government/Tatmadaw leaders
·
gives the Tatmadaw a leading role in parliament,
the executive and the presidency
·
mandates a presidential system of government
·
creates three parliamentary chambers at national
level: The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (national
parliament), the Pyithu Hluttaw (people’s lower house) and the Amoytha Hluttaw
(Ethnic Nationalities upper house) but it gives the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw its own constitutional competence and
legislative standing-similar to a Peoples Republic of China People’s Assembly, as
well as competence to deal with deadlocked bills and so on, and it also sits as
the electoral college to elect the President
·
provides for a maximum of one session per year
for the parliament
·
establishes a constitutional tribunal that has
the power to give opinions before the fact and review of parliamentary
legislation, as of right.
·
shapes the state through the narrow prism of the
SPDC’s state ideal as being led by the Tatmadaw
·
mandates a national culture
·
imports the three national causes into every
area of life, including political parties
·
maintains sovereignty of the rulers
·
incorporates the Tatmadaw command and control
modus operandi into the state structure
·
further entrenches the centralization of the
executive to the capital (Rangoon) as well.
·
limits the functions and power of the Ethnic Nationalities
in legislative bodies to a few Ethnic Nationalities specific areas
·
charts a transition from a Tatmadaw administration
to a civilian administration. However there is a constitutional caveat on this,
also implied in point seven of the seven-step roadmap
Most importantly, the SPDC Constitution
does not --
·
include popular sovereignty
·
include the people’s aspirations, made clear in
1990 and in the National Convention and other fora
·
resolve the fundamental national political
problem manifested in Federalism, and Ethnic Nationalities needs
·
allow political freedoms
·
seek to resolve the Ethnic Nationalities needs
·
seek to reconcile differences and or embrace
diversity
·
recognize the state as being one of
multi-ethnicity and political diversity
·
give amnesty for political actors other than the
SPDC/Tatmadaw
·
provide for state and region constitutions
are, in the words of our constitutional expert, truly fatal flaws.
A true Constitution
must guarantee the following Bill of Rights
9. Human Rights
Guarantee Human
Rights
Strict
guarantees of human rights and respect for human dignity. A Human Rights
Committee should be established. It should be responsible to the highest
legislative body to prevent government from abusing power and violating
citizens’ rights. A democratic Burma with its Constitution must guarantee
everyone’s personal freedom.
Release all
prisoners of conscience and political prisoners. All of these individuals and
their family members have been treated as criminals because of their thoughts,
speeches, writings etc. The state should grant Reparations. A Truth
Investigative Commission could have a mandate to find facts about injustices
and atrocities and determine responsibility for them, uphold justice and seek
social reconciliation.
Freedom
of Expression, Freedom to Assemble, Freedom to Form Groups and Freedom of
Religion and Language and the Right to Own Property and Freedom from
Arbitrary Confiscation, Land or Cultivators' Rights etc.. are crucial.
10. Political/negotiation process:
Principle demands
During
the build-up to the 2010 election there must be an inclusive political process. Only then can the de facto become the de
jure. The SPDC can become truly
legitimate, if it agrees to a Real Democracy.
Recently released long-time political prisoner, who was held for 19
years, U Win Tin, says the relevant slogan is -- "Suu, Hlut, Twé, Hpwè."
Suu or Aung San Suu Kyi and the
political leadership; NLD, 1988 generation leaders etc. must be free.
Hlut or Hluttaw (Parliament) must meet and be
functional. (In 1998, Aung San Suu Kyi
formed the CRPP (Committee to Represent Peoples Parliament) due to the SPDC's
exclusionary actions.
Twé
or Twé Sone Sway Nway Pwe (Political Dialogue)
Hpwè or
Freedom to Organize.
11. Basic Conditions which need to be satisfied:
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners need to be freed and
assured of their personal security and given space to carry out their political
and party duties for all time. Kangaroo
courts need to stop and be under an independent judiciary system.
12. Approach: Openness – with media etc. and Re-structuring.
Burma is now a strictly closed and oppressive system, with bloggers, citizen
journalists etc. given long arbitray prison sentences in show trails. This
needs to stop and the executive and judiciary branches of government set apart
from each other. Political changes and
economic changes need to proceed in tandem.
The
Constitutional Framework
13. The Burmese
Democracy Movement cannot accept the SPDC Constitution.
·
Basic Human Rights are not guaranteed.
·
Principles of equality and popular sovereignty
are ignored.
·
Military supremacy will be exercised.
·
The rule of law, which is a major foundation for
economic development, is ignored.
·
Economics in the SPDC Constitution is
"handled" in a very domineering way – that SPDC "owns all
resources below and above the ground!"
This needs to be changed.
·
Existing unjust laws will remain in force and
more unjust laws will emerge.
·
The Judiciary will be under the direct control
of the Executive and Justice will be denied.
·
Self-rule and shared rule for the ethnic
nationalities will not be a reality.
·
The Executive is the focal point of the
Constitution, and the President, together with the Chief of Staff of the
Defense Forces, will exercise rigid centralization.
·
Institutions that could balance the power of the
Executive are absent.
·
There is no flexible amendment clause that can
provide space for further constitutional evolution in accordance with the
desire of all ethnic nationalities of Burma to rebuild the country as a Federal
Democratic Union.
14.
Basic
Principles of a Constitution:
A federal system. Limited government, checks and balances, a
government of the people, by the people, for the people. A level playing field. No one is above the law. An independent judiciary. A free press.
Reduce central control and unduly centralized management and
administration. The central government
must be checked by built-in institutional balances. An Interim Constitution should reflect these
basic conditions:
·
Legislative and executive bodies should be
designed based on shared responsibilities.
As the role of the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) will be acknowledged, so also
the Tatmadaw must reciprocally acknowledge the role of elected representatives
of the People in making decisions.
·
The interests of ethnic nationalities, in
harmony with the interest of the whole country, must be accommodated. Fundamental rights of ethnic nationalities
must be constitutionally guaranteed, at minimum, rights for protection and
promotion of literature and culture, as well as non-discrimination based on
ethnicity must be assured.
·
Fundamental freedoms and basic human rights of
the People must be constitutionally guaranteed.
·
There must be constitutional provisions, which
protect an independent judiciary and equality of all before the law, and the
guarantee that the rule of law will prevail.
·
The Constitution-making process should provide
an opportunity to continue the national dialogue for Transition. There must be flexible provisions for
constitutional amendments to provide space for constitutional evolution in
harmony with the times and political developments.
15. Recommendations for the International Community
The international community should
encourage SPDC
To ensure an inclusive,
participatory and transparent constitution-making process
To initiate a constitutional
review process which has already been drafted and published, with a view to
finding common ground that reflects the People's Will. Release all political
prisoners (including ethnic leaders), lift restrictions on political parties
(including ethnically based parties) to allow them to re-open offices and
operate.
Lift restrictions so people can
express their opinions.
End
hostilities in minority areas and allow representatives to enter the process.
Amend the provisions which
prevent Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from standing for election in 2010. Ensure
international standards for a free and fair election. Allow independent international observers.
Points
from the CRPP
We
need a new legal system that comes from the people and the Hluttaw (Parliament)
now represented by the CRPP. A Bill of
Rights. A Democratic Process of making
Laws of the People, by the People, for the People.
16. CRPP Recommendations
With
regard to Parliamentary Committees, the CRPP recommends. A Scrutiny Committee
(to examine) "guarantees, promises and undertakings given by" the
SPDC. The SPDC has been notorious in its
manipulation of the entire process by which it has been attempting to legitimize
itself.
The States/Divisions Committee needs
to work on development programs.
Parliamentary
sessions must be held in Rangoon, which is the natural historical, economic and
political capital of Burma. In 2005 the
capital was moved. Geography and an oppressive, perverted "city planning"
has made Naypyidaw an isolated, centrally controlled place where political
activism is impossible.
There needs to
be public education in democratic due process.
17. Recommendations
in Agricultural Rights
·
Notification No. 4/78 should be abrogated immediately
and entirely.
·
On paper, the 1963 Cultivators' Rights
Protection Law prohibited issuing warrants, confiscating land and farm animals
etc. This law has been repeatedly and
seriously violated. Any new government
should ensure laws such as these are abided by.
·
One law provides protection for
money-lenders. As the CRPP notes,
"This is not the kind of law that protects farmers' rights."
·
What is essential is legislation that will
protect farmers from laws and orders which deprive them of their rights and a
law which will shield them from all forms of oppression.
·
Restoration of grazing lands.
·
Rights on alluvial lands (Myay-nu-kyun) which
currently are only for one year need to be much more secure.
·
Although the state is the ultimate owner of all
land, farmers need the right to cultivate, transport, mill, store and sell
their products freely.
·
Enact legislation so cultivators have rights to
land ownership and can transfer or pawn their land.
·
Legislation to prevent the return of big land
owners. Big landowners (oligarchs) are
already coming into existence again in Burma.
·
Prices, banks and markets – see the Economics
section of this Plan.
·
Organize, expand and modernize the Land Records
and Settlement Department, originally formed in the colonial period.
18. Labor Laws and Rights
·
Between 1948 and 1962, there were a total of 30
different labor laws.
·
Outdated Agricultural Workers and Wages Act of
1948-49 needs to be reformed
and
modernized.
·
In trying to make the Union of Burma a
parliamentary democracy, there needs to be
conformity in every respect with the
international community especially as an
integral part of the United Nations.
·
We must not be at odds with the ILO where labor
issues are concerned.
19. Federalism, States' or
Ethnic Rights
To create unity
and solidarity it is essential to adopt and practice a democratic system and
multi-nationalism in accordance with the spirit of the historic Panglong
Agreement. For instance the conditions
under which the Shans joined was to join under a union/federal system, to have
equal rights and status, Shan States must be given unfettered self-government,
to be given the right to secede at any time if so desire.
These basic rights are likely to become explosive issues. CRPP mentions "a sufficient
population" and the SPDC "constitution" also talks about
"size of population" without mentioning the exact size of the
population (when a separate state will be allowed). Leading democratic politicians have said that
the Wa state, where the Wa have been given the right to bear arms and tacitly
engage in opium and methamphetamine production, is likely to become a problem.
On Feb 24, 1962,
ethnic nationalities representatives pointed out the shortcomings of the 1947
Constitution and proposed a change to Federalism. The army seized power under the pretext that
it would lead to the Union's disintegration and that the Shan States was
arranging to secede. The military erroneously
looked on itself as the savior and natural ruler of the country and their
propaganda emphasized this. In fact,
what they established was a political policy based on militarism. From 1962 to 1988 they governed the country
under the cloak of socialism with a single party dictatorship.
20. General legal
recommendations
·
Legislative transparency and awareness campaigns
of new (democratic) land tenure arrangements.
·
Subsequent legislation that is clear and
transparently enforced through independent processes, including specialized
courts.
·
Complement land title with other reforms,
efficient and independent judicial systems, reformed financial laws, install
bankruptcy and foreclosure laws etc.
·
Ensure formal laws are consistent with local
social and cultural values.
·
Property Laws need to honor original ownership
before 1962. There has been widespread
talking over of private property both by the military government and other
military connected individuals, in both rural and urban areas.
B. Electoral
Law and System
21. Genuine
elections are not just a technical exercise.
They are a fundamental human
right
linked to a broad array of institutions and the ability of citizens to exercise
civil
and political rights.
·
Elections
are the periodic test of the strength of democratic institutions.
·
Elections
are a vehicle for citizens' participation in the political process.
·
Elections
are part of making democracy deliver a better quality of life by linking
voters' interests to the act of selecting a candidate, party or policy through
public discourse.
22. Contortions or distortions in electoral law and system to
unfairly benefit certain political interests which can happen through show or
sham elections, sham referendums, electoral fraud, gerrymandering (setting
voting districts or borders to favor certain political parties or interests),
ballot design, faulty vote counting, voter registration fraud etc.and should be
eliminated.
23. Burmese electoral laws under military regimes
First principles regarding electoral laws are
that Citizens' Rights, not State or Corporate Rights should be protected.
In Burmese electoral laws under successive
military regimes we find that state's rights are constantly defined, demarcated
and mapped out to protect the regime's own interests at the expense of
individual and group rights.
For instance, the 1975 (election) law, is
clearly titled, State Protection Law, Pyithu Hlutta Law No. 3, 1975, and talks
of the regime's usual obsessions about "infringement of sovereignty and
security of the Union of Burma . . . threat to peace of the people. . .
threat of those desiring to cause subversive acts, etc." These kinds of "laws" and biased
and paranoid language have no place in a real democracy.
Article 3 even talks of "protecting in
advance!" against "threats to security" by which one presumes it
means "protective custody" a.k.a. arrest and imprisonment. The 1975 law said it could "declare a
state of emergency for any territory in the country"and "may, if
necessary, restrict any citizen's fundamental rights in any territory on the
Union of Burma." In reality, rights
are routinely abuses everywhere in Burma and it is chilling to read it in legal
language.
Such language as "necessary
restriction" is used in this law and Article 11 mentions restriction of
activity in designated territories, "designation of place where person –
is to reside" "denial of travel" and "denial of possession
of specific materials."
The 1988 New Elections Commission Law
established the figurehead commission for the 1990 elections, which turned out
to be free and fair, in which the NLD won.
This was in spite of the SLORC Law No. 6/88
of Sept. 30, 1988 which attempted to restrict formation of organizations and
parties and asserted control by the Ministry of Home and Religious
Affairs.
Years after the NLD victory and even after
SLORC clearly did not transfer power, in 1996 it out put a retroactive law
"safeguarding the state from the danger of subversive elements."
For its upcoming 2010 elections, the SPDC has
not yet announced an electoral law, but it has already unilaterally held a
referendum, days after Cyclone Nargis hit, and also "rigged" the
Constitution so that Daw Suu is de-barred from standing for election.
24. Recommended electoral law reforms
In addition to necessary constitution review
and review of electoral procedures, we recommend electoral reform. Some recommendations are:
·
Those
that improve the expression of public desires in the voting process and reduce
controls or restrictions biased towards reducing participation of true
democratic forces and increase participation of pseudo-parties or
regime-sympathetic "parties."
A number of these have already been formed.
·
Fool-proof
vote counting procedures, preferably electronic, run by international agencies. Appropriate ballot design and voting
booths. In 1990, there were reports of
booths in which outsiders could observe how each individual voted because there
was a gap in the curtain of about 6 inches from the floor, and the 2 ballot
boxes were placed so far apart.
·
Safety
of voters and election workers needs to be strongly assured.
·
Monitoring
by United Nations Fair Elections Commission, International IDEA, National
Democratic Institute and other volunteer international observers, entry visas
for international media and right to travel all over Burma during the election.
·
Use of
UN Standards for safety of citizens, coercion, scrutiny and eligibility to
vote.
·
Extend
and expand electorate to include political prisoners, Burmese overseas, Burmese
migrant workers all adult members of all ethnic groups including the rohingya
and Burmese minority groups in exile.
·
Review
definitions of "refugee"
"citizen" "right of return" etc.
·
Open and
transparent process throughout.
·
This time after going through another "SPDC
charade" the SPDC has to honor the results if pro-democracy parties
win.
·
Before the
elections it has to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners,
assure their safety and guarantee freedom of organization, freedom of movement,
and freedom of expression.
·
Before the
elections, there has to be an open and inclusive constitutional review process.
.
C. An Economic Plan: Stabilization and Structural Change
25. So far, only token
“economic reforms” have taken place.
Major reforms are still needed.
Burmese economists and political leaders support free trade and an open
economy. The NLD is not advocating
removing sanctions. Free trade and
sanctions are not mutually exclusive. Sanctions
have already been focused into financial sanctions.
The main
economic problems (in the agricultural sector, which is predominant) are:
Monopoly of rice
export by the government, non-ownership of land by farmers and annual permit
required to farm, quotas demanded by government and local authorities at prices
lower than market rates, lack of fertilizers and fuel and lack of a modern
agricultural credit system.
The "open
economy" SLORC declared in 1988 was an improvement over BSPP policies
1962-1988, but politics still conditions economics.
26. Economic goals: Burma
should promote a healthy rural sector, a
healthy macro-economic environment and promote manufactured exports. However rich in natural resources, the only
sustainable source of exports and growth are in manufacturing.
Stabilization and structural change need to take place for true
economic reforms.
Burma has a very distorted economy, with a
control mentality, and many elements of the Burma Socialist Program Party
policies, such as state-owned enterprises, fixed prices, planned crops,
compulsory delivery quotas (until 2003), a fixed exchange rate and multiple
exchange rates still in place. State
ownership in the form of military holding companies (UMEH) has been increasing,
also due to arbitrary land confiscation.
This is related to asymmetrical power relations.
27. Stabilization
The severest distortions need to be corrected and then almost
simultaneously, structural reforms need to take place.
·
It is inadvisable to merely adopt International
Monetary Fund/World Bank recommendations of "freeing prices" (price
liberalization) without system change.
·
In August 2007 fuel prices were raised. These resulted in protests and the monks
marching. The clampdown on Sept 26,
2007, led to this current round of the severest repression yet suffered. Clearly micro-economic "reforms"
such as these applied in an ad hoc way without structural reforms do not
work. There needs to be reforms, but the
reforms should be of a systemic nature (macro-economic) and not piece-meal
token reforms (micro-economic or cosmetic).
·
Multiple exchange rates must be unified. They cause corruption and constrain foreign
investment.
·
A floating (market) rate rather than a pegged
one.
·
Since 2002, income from mainly natural gas
exports has changed chronic deficits in the current account of the balance of
payments to consistent surpluses and comprises nearly 40% of Burma's exports by
value in 2006/2007. Gas earnings are
nearly invisible in public accounts.
28. Money and Banking
Money supply is too large, resulting in continuous
hyperinflation. An interim government or
new power-sharing government needs to attend to reducing money supply (mainly
the volume of paper currency, as credit is a negligible amount). New currency notes will probably be
needed. A floating exchange rate will
take care of needed devaluation and help Burma's foreign trade.
SPDC
does not seem to be aware of its role in causing inflation through its increase
in money supply (printing banknotes and high budget expenditures) There are
moneys it spends on the repressive mechanism, for "prestige projects"
and for buying support to keep itself in power. Curiously, the SPDC
"constitution" has a provision that the "union shall not
demonetize the currency legally in circulation."
Liberalize
(and unify) the exchange rate. Let
market forces (demand and supply) set the rate.
Then the multiple exchange rates will be automatically
"unified" as at any given moment there will only be one prevailing
market (floating) rate. All currency exchanges need to be legalized. It should be legal for anyone to hold foreign
exchange.
Structural Change
in the Agricultural Sector
29. In the agricultural sector
planned crops and other forms of interference have returned. Farm indebtedness is high. There are few formal credit institutions, and
severe ecological problems in the Dry Zone and the Irrawaddy Delta (even before
Cyclone Nargis). Poor roads and other
infrastructure with low capital in agro-processing hamper growth. Since the 1970s there has been depletion of
mangrove forests in the Delta. There is a high percentage of broken rice grains
due to outdated milling machinery. This
has affected the quality of the polished rice and the export price.Arbitrary
taxes are imposed at the local level.
This takes too much from the farmer's meager resources. They cannot invest in improving the land or
buy farm machinery. Forced (corvee)
labor is oppressive.
30. Macro-policies
need to be changed. Even higher levels
of natural gas production would accomplish little without structural
reforms. In 2008 the Burmese real growth
rate was zero per cent. Income from
natural gas exports seemed to mitigate this.
The Burmese economy is run as a centralized military
administration with a high degree of central control. The issue of narcotics alone should make Burma a nation of
concern. Methamphetamines have joined
opium, and the Wa region in eastern Burma has become the Wa Autonomous
Region.
31. Land
reform
Rural land is formally owned by the
state. Individuals have 30-year
inheritable use rights (usufructs) determined by village level and regional
land committees.
·
Farmers
must have rights to own their land.
·
Introduce long-term leases.
Mass landlessness is taking place
due to arbitrary "rules" which give the farmer cultivation rights
only. They don't actually own the land,
nor can they sell it nor use it as collateral for loans. They can lose the land at any time due to
harassment by local authorities. These
wrongs need to be righted. Burma is still a predominantly agricultural country,
has not yet achieved an industrial revolution.
There is sell off of natural resources.
The degree and scope of landlessness after Cyclone Nargis in Irrawaddy
Delta in May 2008 matches that during the 1930s Depression when land was lost
en masse to the chettiars.
Agricultural
sector reforms
·
Allow farmers to grow what they wish. Remove planned crops, e.g. kyet su
(jatropha). Build up
infrastructure. Support with
agricultural banking reforms.
32. Banking Reforms
(i) Revitalize Commercial Banks
The
establishment of trust and the application of best-practice banking regulations
is important. Burma signed the Basel Accords (the international ‘standard’),
but in practice bank regulation is corrupt, ad-hoc and ineffectual.
Implementation is key.
The Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM),
which has lost credibility, must be reformed. The reformed central bank must be
independent of government. There are restrictions on private banks that do
nothing for prudence or efficiency, whilst inhibiting financial development.
E.g. limits on branch numbers, bank products, bank deposits and loans. These restrictions should be removed.
Burma’s
financial sector should be open to internationally respected foreign banks.
Applications to establish new private commercial banks should be called for. To
forestall inappropriate applications to form ponzi-type schemes and to engage
in money-laundering, there should be strict application of the Basel
Principles. "Fit and proper"
persons should be selected to become bank owners. Existing banks should be reviewed.
(ii) Revitalizing State-Owned Banks
The
state will need to play a role in the country’s financial sector. The state can
provide capital to financial institutions, which can distribute
credit according to commercial criteria. Before any state-owned banks can perform
such a role, any new government will need to assess existing institutions. Non-performing loans need to be identified
and recalled. State-owned banks should be reviewed and unnecessary ones merged,
sold or closed.
(iii) Revitalizing Rural Credit
Ninety
per cent of Burma’s farmers are without formal credit, and are forced to borrow
from village moneylenders etc. who charge high interest rates and are
corrupt. Over half of all rural
households are heavily in debt. MADB (Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank) needs
to be restructured, recapitalized and rolled into a new umbrella institution
incorporating microfinance.
Micro-finance is not
sufficient. It does not provide enough
capital for broad-based development.
33. Economic
Reforms in the Natural Gas (Mining) Sectors
Income from natural gas
exports has resulted in corruption, conspicuous consumption of individuals, as
well as "collective consumption" at the public level and lumpiness in
payment timing.
Windfall
gains have been managed in other gas and oil producing countries and regions
with Revenue Distribution Funds which go directly from the projects to the people, by-passing the state.
For
Burma, assuming a genuinely reform-minded government, gas revenues should be
channeled into a core private sector, rather than forming special funds. There should be caps on public spending,
creation of an independent oversight committee, transparency and a free press.
In gem mining the
government needs to give up its monopoly of mining and its abuse of mine
workers and allow the traditional small-scale miners who protected the resource
and respected it to return with their "Buddhist model." (Mogok gem mining).
There is no need to remove the JADE/Tom Lantos act
of USA (sanctions against gem and jade imports to USA) as gem merchants in
Burma say it has not much effect anyway – it may be used as a
"prestige" or "feel-good" bargaining chip in negotiation
for change.
34. Economic Recommendations
Stabilization and structural change policies should
be instituted immediately.
The population should be free to
move wherever they wish and work at whatever they choose. Labor needs to be paid a living wage or
salaries and have labor unions and other protective mechanisms and legislation
in place. Farmers need to own their
land, be supported by infrastructure and bank loans, proper legislation and
process regarding return of confiscated land.
Free
trade. At the moment Burma has no
option but export-led growth, in spite of the world economic recession. Agricultural commodities would remain major
exports while another attempt is made at an industrial revolution. Rice acreage should be increased and
self-sufficiency in edible oils encouraged.
To promote competitiveness, import duties should be reduced.
Set
up a stock exchange. Encourage
domestic saving and foreign investment – not only foreign corporations
investing in Burma, but also the small Burmese saver/investor allowed to invest
overseas.
State (public) ownership should
be minimized, especially small scale private enterprises should be encouraged
and supported.
State-owned enterprises
The
new style oligarchs: UMEHL (Union of
Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited)
mainly owned by the military generals and their families, and rich
private citizens, need to be regulated by anti-monopoly or anti-trust laws. Ordinary
citizens should be allowed to do more.
These should be combined with anti-corruption and labor protection laws
which are actually implemented. A free
press will help.
The
CRPP warns these oligarchs or "comrades", also called pariah
capitalists, need to be carefully watched.
Those given contracts or import/export permits have become very
wealthy. Those with projects for 5000
acres or more will have permission to carry out the projects for 30 years, and
will be allowed to export half their rice produce legally. CRPP warns that people will forge
statistics. The "comrades"
will also get other special privileges and loans. Authorities plan to allocate large tracts of
land and have already assigned tens of thousands of acres in some townships.
Take
legal action against the worst of predatory entrepreneurs or land grabbers.
This is something a new interim government must do. Work out deals with some in exchange for
political and economic freedoms and guarantees.
The playing field should be level.
Set up Special Economic Zones
The
global economy is in Recession (China included) and China is moving from
export-led growth to domestic demand-led growth, what should Burma do? The answer
is, Burma is not China and has no sizeable domestic market in terms of both
purchasing power and population size. It
also is not yet an industrialized nation.
So it will still have to continue to rely on manufactured exports. Save
what is left and rebuild natural resources, including forests, water resources
and bio-diversity. Some of this
exploitation and environmental degradation may be irreversible. It may take decades to revive the Irrawaddy
Delta.
35. Burma has no external enemies and yet has had an on-going civil war since
1947, the longest in the world. There
are white areas, gray areas and black areas based on the security level. There is major narco-trafficking. There are ceasefire groups and non-ceasefire
groups and paramilitaries. The large
number of internally displaced and the continuous outflow of refugees into all
the neighboring countries since 1962 attests to the fact that the security
situation is severely eroded. Civilian
control of the military is important
and needs to be instituted immediately.
36. The CRPP Policy Vision stresses civilian control of the military. It states that (civilian appointed) chief of
armed forces "needs consideration whether the position should be on a par
with the senior-most personnel in other ministries or not." It proposes time limits on the post of
Supreme Commander. "The State
Defense and Security Council is to take over for the Directorate of Military
Intelligence. . .
. The Defense must be of a high
standard, modern, honorable and ready to protect Democracy and be at one with
the People."
Since the end of World War II Burma
has had no external enemies. Despite
that it has the largest army in S.E. Asia, and with money from drugs and
natural gas exports, it has built up and is likely to equip it further.
37. Size
of army – reduce size of army. The
Burmese army is variously estimated as having 300 to 350,000 to 500,000
personnel (400,000 combat troops). This
is much larger than is required for Burma's external security, highlighting the
obvious, that it is configured by the SPDC's need to stifle internal opposition
and run a military-dominated state.
Slimming down the army will also improve the budget. If there is significant political change,
individuals may voluntarily move out of the army.
38. The
Army and its officers are above the law and have extensive economic
holdings. There is rank inflation and
cronyism on a vast scale, combined with corruption due to absolute power.
39. A positive approach will acknowledge the role of the
military as an important institution of the state in nation building. It must work in conjunction with an elected
democratic government and itself acknowledge that other groups also have
important roles to play.
Democratization can be done phase by phase
with the cooperation of the military without damaging the stability of the
country and unity of all ethnic nationalities. The Burmese military needs to
understand that it can do power-sharing or give up power and return to the
barracks and have a good role in society as well as avoiding a violent
sunset. The economy would also grow
faster and bigger. In Brazil the army
gave up power voluntarily and has since achieved successful transition under
several civilian presidents and has had high economic growth, even though the
civil-military relationship fluctuated over several presidencies. The army will not give up power in one
dramatic step. Small steps are more
feasible.
Sharing
of responsibilities among the elected politicians, technocrats experienced in
governance and nation-building, and military leaders is the best option for
national reconciliation.
40. There needs to be a New Professional Army
Modernization of the Tatmadaw will be one of the key
agendas in nation-building. Military exchange programs with other military
academies and further studies for officers on defense and security in
universities of developed countries will be arranged
Welfare
of the disabled, retired military personnel and remaining family members of
those who sacrificed their lives will be
taken care of by the State.
A special commission composed of
democratic watch groups, citizens' groups, NLD etc. will examine eligibility
for pensions. There needs to be a
totally transparent process; anyone can attend the hearings (open door.)
Prepare
to contribute forces for international peace and security, send forces to join
UN Peace- Keeping Forces in accordance with the obligation Burma made at the
UN. This should be after the
existing military has been re-structured and transformed into a professional
army. The curricula at the Defense
Academy and Hmawbi Officers' Training should be re-tooled to reflect democratic
values. The corporate culture of the
existing military has to be changed. It
would be disastrous if the present average soldiers who have been given the
license to rape, loot and mistreat population were unleashed to "help in
peace-keeping or disaster relief."
Upgrade skills for natural
disaster relief and emergency humanitarian operations, domestically as well as
internationally.
Competent,
properly trained, non-lethal and non-thuggish riot control which stresses doing
the least harm, preventing death and leaving escape routes open.
True volunteer recruitment rather
than the forced "recruitment" (kidnappings) taking place right now.
No children in the army. Existing or former child soldiers to be given
counseling and job placement help.
Reduce
the military budget and as a percentage of total budget expenditures. Insist that all expenditures are shown in the
budget. Go through budget headings and
review line by line so that each expenditure item is placed under the correct
heading. Most probably many military
related items are either not shown in the budget or are disguised under other
budget headings or ministries. Total
transparency is necessary.
Separation
of the Police and the Army
Police
should be under the Civilian Minister of Home Affairs.
Military Businesses should be
truly privatized or auctioned off.
Judiciary System for Military
Personnel – military courts with civilian legal oversight and open court
hearings. The importance of this cannot
be overemphasized.
The
composition of the National Security Council.
It must include civilian experts on the military and retired army
personnel with proven track records of belief in democracy. The NLD's U Tin Oo would be the ideal
chairperson for this. We need to
cultivate more people like U Tin Oo.
The
composition of the National Intelligence Agencies (Administrative Structure and
role of Bureau of Military Security Affairs (MI), Special Branch (SB), should
be reviewed by an independently appointed commission.
The appointment of military
officers as bureaucrats in Government Ministries and State owned enterprises
should be reviewed by an independently appointed commission. Their numbers should be minimized as
generally they know nothing about the businesses/departments they supposedly
run.
Promotion
and Appointments in the Army especially appointment of Chiefs of Staff,
Regional Commanders and the rank of General and above should be set by the
Union Government composed of elected civilian leaders and military
professionals.
E. National
Reconciliation
41. At present the military junta is a pariah among
nations in the U.N. and the international community. Relations may be described as
ultra-nationalistic or xenophobic and paranoid on the part of the SPDC, and
cautiously optimistic on the part of the international diplomatic and democratic
community. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD
have always said they are willing to engage in dialog, so long as it is
meaningful.
Within Burma the army is severely
estranged from the rest of society, which it probably assumes to be its
enemies, in the traditional Burmese way in which government is one of the main
five enemies of the individual. The
people meanwhile are engaged in activism and confrontation (a small minority)
and in avoidance and escape in a physical as well as a mental sense. The Burmese diaspora consists of large
numbers of Burmese overseas living as refugees, stateless persons, asylees and
as legal migrants or workers.
42. Any new interim government based on power-sharing
needs to
·
Make reconciliation internationally and domestically
a priority.
·
Promote an atmosphere of trust and goodwill.
·
Come to some recognition of wrongs committed and
some form of closure, perhaps through Truth and Reconciliation processes.
·
Attempt to achieve closure through symbolic,
ceremonial and religious events and monuments.
43. The CRPP recommends
·
To
protect the interests of those who lost their lives and their families,
necessary laws must be enacted and suitable provisions made for
guarantees.
·
Directives,
advice, speeches, views and declarations made by Bogyoke Aung San . .
. must be given special
attention.
·
After
careful consideration of the country's economic development, progress in
science and technology and human resources, a defense force appropriate in size
must be established.
·
It is
important to stay within budget constraints.
Everything will not be accomplished at once, but will go step by
step. Parliament will be the arbiter of
the methods to be applied and the tasks to be undertaken.
·
There
must be only one defense force.
·
Review
officer recruitment to build up a youthful force with excellent quality, high
standards – a modern and dignified officer corps.
·
Modern
top quality weapons and other equipment.
·
Training.
·
Women in
the armed forces. Appropriate training,
protection of women in the forces.
Human Security
Human
security has many aspects such as internal security, domestic security, property
security, intellectual security, food security etc. In this Plan we focus on the main issues.
44. Release of Political Prisoners, Return of
Refugees and Displaced Persons and future security of those persons
Immediately release unconditionally all political
prisoners and prisoners of conscience including Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo.
Establish Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary to guarantee Human
Rights and the political participation of the People. Rule of Law means respect for Human Rights,
Separation of Powers based on an Independent Parliamentary System, Judiciary
and Courts, bound by Law with recognition of separate legal systems.
Establish
and enforce norms, standards and procedures required for efficient and
equitable functioning of the economy. Ensure transparency of these
norms, standards, and procedures. Increase terms of service and security
of tenure for Government staff.
Create
a professional civil service.
Provide public goods such as a
good education and health care system, agricultural research pertinent to
farmers. In the government budget, spend more social services, health
and education, safe water supply, and sanitation. Create an environment
conducive to the growth of civil society.
Ensure
Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights. Ensure free availability of
all official, local and international documents, free and open Internet Access.
Set up an appropriate legal
framework to assure the independence of the public media. There can be no
policy as process without a public which is able, free, and well-supported by
Law originating from the People
participate in social change.
45. Human security in the agricultural sector: Growing food is life and death
The farmer is not a rice-eating
robot.
One
third of rural households are landless.
Citizens
of Burma have no land rights.
Ownership
of land is vested in the state.
Farmers
are forced to grow certain crops.
F. Return of
Refugees and Displaced Persons in a New Administration, when Conditions are Normalized
46. There are estimated to be over 703,000
refugees and displaced persons, of which about 203,000 are refugees living in
mainly Thailand and Bangladesh with another 500,000 displaced persons mainly in
eastern Burma.
Voluntary
return and reintegration would be the best and most durable solution for this
population, which has been in a state of protracted displacement. For this to
happen conditions needs to be in place for a safe and dignified return and the
displaced persons need assurances of their physical safety before eventually
opting to return.
47. Concept of
"DDR" -- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of the
Military
A transition to
democracy will involve a reduction in the nearly half a million strong Burmese
army. Both the dismissed troops as well
as the country’s armed ethnic resistance groups add to the proliferation of
weaponry. Any plan for peace must
include provisions for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
combatants.
Disarmament will
be crucial to maintaining internal and regional stability. Arms that are not
repossessed by government or destroyed may end up fueling conflicts in
neighboring states, entering the black
market, increasing weapon proliferation, general instability and organized
crime and the number of dacoits (brigands).
A DDR plan must
provide a structured program of education and vocational training, to
facilitate ex-combatants’ socio-economical re-integration into society.
Because
demobilization and reintegration is extremely resource intensive, it will be
important to secure long-term commitment by the international community, both
financially and politically, to a process that often takes years. Since the arms market straddles borders, a
regional approach is necessary. A successful program needs to be integrated
with broader development and peace-building.
·
De-mining for safety in the affected areas.
·
A framework of international principles and
humanitarian conditions that would provide the basis for return and
reintegration.
·
Formation
of a national DDR commission which includes all relevant parties, UN, country
donors, the new government etc..
·
Development of a comprehensive, efficient and
safe arms management program
The
disarmament of Burma’s armed groups must be proportional, fair and transparent.
·
Information campaign on repatriation on both
sides of the border; “go and see” visits and “come and tell” visits in order to
promote repatriation.
·
Creation of a system of transitional assistance
for the demobilized
Demobilization
sites must be safe and accessible. Ex-combatants will be informed of the
demobilization process, given advice and information, and receive medical
screening.
Reinsertion
assistance must address ex-combatants’ immediate basic needs of food, clothing,
medical treatment and transportation.
·
Technical and other material assistance for the
repatriation process including reinforcement of human resources, necessary
infrastructure, logistics and communication.
·
Development of educational, vocational, and
reconciliation programs to assist in reintegration. Programs should provide information,
counseling and referral on education, health services, and job opportunities.
Capacity building activities such as courses and workshops.
·
Assistance towards a successful
reintegration. Donor mobilization to
support repatriation and reintegration.
Some co-ordination and umbrella organizations already exist.
·
Special groups, such as women, children, young
adults, disabled or chronically ill individuals, should be given focused
support.
·
Creation of institutions to deal with land
distribution and property rights for ex-combatants. Resolution of legal issues e.g. land disputes
for people returning to their communities.
·
Restorative methods and activities.
48. Recommendations
for Human Security
·
Immediately cease violations of housing, land,
and property, arbitrary confiscation of land, labor, and property and forcible
eviction and displacement of individuals
·
Ensure legal framework to return farmers to
their arbitrarily confiscated land.
·
Ensure housing, land, and property rights
(customary law) are addressed consistently with international human rights
law. Protect equal rights of
marginalized landless groups, ethnic minorities, women and children.
·
Ratify international human rights treaties.
Embed these standards into national legislation and implement them.
·
Enshrine the United Nations Principles on
Housing and Property Restitution (The Pinheiro Principles) in national
legislation. Create legal and other mechanisms guaranteeing the rights of
displaced persons to voluntarily return safely and with dignity.
·
Establish a national land research centre to
develop a comprehensive land policy in consultation with farmers, ethnic
communities and scholars, to address land tenure systems. To adjudicate among the many conflicting
claims on land, create a system of compensation or/and re-establishment on
land. Land policy needs to be
transparent and based on clearly-defined principles and guidelines.
·
Legislate land and property ownership rights for
security of tenure, assurance that a farmer's improvements on land will not be
lost, cost of capital improvements can be recovered when land is sold, and land
can be used to secure loans.
·
Create clear, precise legislation for land
ownership, land use, land transfer, and enforcement of legal claims to land in
dispute. Full community participation in the settlement of land issues is
crucial.
·
Consider rights to water to prevent
over-exploitation from small-scale borehole or river extraction.
Restitution
49. Land needs to be returned to the rightful
owners. As the rightful owners are now
landless in cities, in neighboring countries or dead, with fragmented families,
especially after Cyclone Nargis, how do we bring them back? Who or which international organization will
help in this? In the past, the
International Organization for Migration has been accused of Human Rights
violations by Human Rights Watch. In
Thailand and India, UNHCR papers afford little protection and migrant laborers,
though now "legalized" suffer severe and strenuous work conditions,
have restricted freedom of movement and are often restricted to the industrial
area (Maha Chai), fishery or agricultural areas. Abuse at employers' hands is severe and
widespread. Many are overworked, not
paid enough and not given enough private time (reportedly, only half a day per
week.)
In
the advent they can't go home yet, or it would be unsafe to do so, or they
don't want to, it is not right that they be forced to go back. Refugees in border camps have been in limbo
for over 20 years. This needs to be
combined with states' and ethnic rights in Burma.
There are also the internally displaced, some
orphaned, estimated at 1 million in 2001, now likely to be more. How can the fact of their displacement be
addressed and they be given their own place back?
50. Health
and Education
Both the Burmese health and education sectors
have been declining since 1962 and the beginning of military central control in
Burma and combined with the central control mentality of the military are now
in a deplorable state. There is a
virtual two track system in both sectors in which specialized and expensive,
sometimes private health care or education, or the possibility of health care
and education overseas is available for the power holders, while everyone else
gets an equal amount of non-care or non-education.
·
There
needs to be universal health care (as in China, barefoot doctors etc) and basic
5-10 years of education for everyone.
·
We do
not have time or space in this report to spell out all the health and education
sector reforms that are necessary for a functioning democracy in this Plan.
·
Even
without system or regime change, health and education sector reforms can be
carried out. However it is unlikely they
will be carried out so long as the power relationships are asymmetrical and
there is no freedom of expression, accountability, Rights and transparency.
·
Burma's
political culture needs a drastic change and this can be best carried out in
the education sector.
Conclusions
51. We
in the Burmese Democracy Movement, including the National League for Democracy,
have a truly Democratic Vision and Plan, have always had one, and if a
power-sharing arrangement can be negotiated, we also know how to proceed at
once. Burma specialists, exiles and the
NLD and others inside have been working on these ideas consistently since as
early as 1993.
The de facto territorial integrity of a poor,
weak and divided nation should not be taken for granted. Civil wars might reappear (they are
re-merging). Regional security and
stability, the regional environment and well-being is being compromised. Only guaranteed Human Rights, Ethnic Rights,
Rule of Law and sustained economic growth can put an end to the zero or
negative sum mentality that poisons possibilities of compromise and
co-operation. Such development includes
political change and would require internal reforms as well as external support.
Any
gain for the democracy forces does not necessarily mean a loss for the Burmese
military. All parties need to see that
if the entire economy grows, even with (limited) power sharing, the net gain
could be much more than it is now. Both
sides need to abandon the military model or paradigm of win-loss and move
towards negotiation and power sharing which would be mutually beneficial. This could be a win-win situation for both
sides.
Power sharing is possible. It is not a zero sum game but can be a growing economic pie. Everyone is likely to do better in a developing political economy.
We hope this Strategic Action Plan will be of use in negotiations for the Freedom of Burma and the Burmese People asit moves to a democratic system and a market economy.
*
